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279EXPECTATIONS OF THE LAW
EXPECTATIONS OF THE LAW IN 12TH AND
13TH CENTURY SCOTLAND
by
HECTOR L. MACQUEEN (Edinburgh)*
In 1993 I published a book that attempted to portray the development in me-
dieval Scotland of a law common to the whole kingdom, based upon the growth
and regularisation of royal justice from the twelfth century on1. Because it was
evident that much in that development had been influenced by what was hap-
pening in contemporary England, I naturally drew heavily upon interpretations
of what underlay English developments, in particular upon the debate sparked
by the work of S.F.C. Milsom. But I think that I can fairly claim that through my
book there runs what is at least a sub-theme, namely, that the role of the Church
was also, in various ways, an important element in the rise of the medieval
Scottish common law, and it is this sub-theme which I wish to highlight and
elaborate in this paper. My argument is that the Church was a crucial formant of
‘expectations of the law’, not only because through its own canon law and eccle-
siastical jurisdiction it was a provider of law, but also because it was a spiritual
and moral critic of, and threat to, secular law and jurisdiction which could not
be ignored. Kings who claimed to reign by the grace of God had to take account
of what the Church said and did about law and legal matters, and the process of
action and reaction which this engendered can clearly be seen as an important
factor in legal change in twelfth and thirteenth-century Scotland.
These centuries were, of course, a crucially formative period in the develop-
ment of law in western Europe generally2. The earlier century – characterised
* Professor of Private Law, University of Edinburgh. This paper was previously pre-
sented at a conference Expectations of the Law in the Middle Ages held at the University of
Exeter in March 2000, and at the Fifteenth British Legal History Conference held at the
University of Wales, Aberystwyth in July 2001. It is an abbreviated version of a longer
paper to be published in a collection of essays on the reign of Alexander II king of Scots
1214–1249, edited by R.D. Oram and to be produced by Tuckwell Press, East Linton, UK.
I am grateful to all those who have commented upon the paper in one or other of its ver-
sions at one or another occasion, in particular to my Edinburgh colleagues, Professor John
Cairns and Mr David Sellar, but am alone responsible for what follows.
1. H.L. MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland, Edinburgh
1993.
2. See for general surveys e.g, F. Wieacker, trans. T. Weir, A History of Private Law in
Europe, Oxford 1995, chs 2–4; O.F. Robinson, T.D. Fergus and W.M. Gordon, Introduc-
tion to European Legal History, 2nd edn., London 1994, chs 2–4; R.C. van Caenegem, An
Historical Introduction to Private Law, Cambridge 1992, ch 3; M. Bellomo, trans. L.G.
Cochrane, The Common Legal Past of Europe 1100–1800, Washington DC 1995, chs 3–7;
S. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900–1300, 2nd edn., Oxford
1997, chs 1 and 2; R.W. Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, I:
Foundations, Oxford 1995, chs 7–9.
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by one historian of law as a period of ‘extremely rapid, intense, and creative
crisis’3 – saw the recovery of the Digest of Justinian and the renewal of its study
and use in teaching, first at the studium generale of Bologna in northern Italy,
and subsequently elsewhere, at universities in the rest of Italy, southern France,
Paris and Oxford. The work of the school known as the Glossators was to cul-
minate in the thirteenth century with the Summa Codicis of Azo (d. 1230) and
the Magna Glossa of Accursius (d. 1263), ‘a huge compilation of glosses or
apparatus of glosses to the whole Corpus Juris Civilis’4. Alongside the redevel-
opment of Roman or civil law marched the law of the Church, the canon law.
Around 1140 the hitherto scattered canons of the Church began to be brought
together by Gratian in what became the unofficial compilation entitled Con-
cordia discordantium canonum but better known as the Decretum5. This pro-
vided the platform for a major expansion of the canon law and the juristic claims
of the Church. In 1234 Pope Gregory IX promulgated an official restatement of
the canon law compiled by Raymond de Peñaforte (d. 1240), and this came to
be known as the Liber Extra. The scholarly techniques which had been applied
to the texts of Roman law were equally brought to bear upon the Corpus Juris
Canonici, which also became part of the legal curriculum in the universities. In
the bull Super speculam of 1219 Pope Honorius III abolished the teaching of
the secular civil law at Paris, confining legal study there to the canon law. While
this was to create a division between canon and civil law of some significance
for the future development of legal studies, it nevertheless remained true that
‘legista sine canonibus parum valet, canonista sine legibus nihil’ (a legist [i.e.
civil lawyer] without the canons is worth very little, a canonist without the civil
laws nothing)6. The point was underlined when in 1235 Pope Gregory IX
authorised the teaching of civil law at Orleans to supplement that of canon law
at Paris.
The rules of the canon law were developed and applied throughout Europe
by a vast machinery of courts and bureaucrats, the authority of which flowed
ultimately from the Pope in Rome. This authority was manifested at the local
level not only by specially authorised papal representatives but also by struc-
tures established under the bishops of the dioceses into which the lands within
the sway of the Church were divided. Further, from such local decision-making
machinery appeal structures led all the way to Rome itself. Canon law laid claim,
not just to the internal arrangements and governance of the Church, but also to
a range of matters affecting the spiritual well-being of its flock. Through its
3. Bellomo, Common Legal Past (supra, n. 2), p. 33.
4. Robinson et al., European Legal History (supra, n. 2), p. 50. See further P. Stein,
Roman Law in European History, Cambridge 1999.
5. What we do not know about Gratian is well discussed in J.T. Noonan, Gratian slept
here: the changing identity of the father of the systematic study of canon law, Traditio, 35
(1979), p. 145–72. See further Southern, Scholastic Humanism (supra, n. 2), p. 283–310.
A. Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum, Cambridge 2000, argues persuasively
that there were two recensions of the Decretum, written between 1139 and 1158, the first
probably by Gratian, the second (the text we know now) possibly not.
6. The maxim was derived from Decretum Gratiani, D. 10 c. 7. See further F. Merz-
bacher, Die Parömie ‘legista sine canonibus parum valet, canonista sine legibus nihil’,
Studia Gratiana, 13 (1967), p. 273–82. For the citation of classical canon law materials see
J.A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, London 1995, appendix 1.
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courts the Church provided the means by which its jurisdictional claims could
be made good. While the precise impact of this upon medieval society varied
from place to place, there can be no doubt that the law of the Church did indeed
form a universal element drawing together the legal culture of contemporary
Europe7.
These developments had impact in Scotland and upon the Scottish Church as
elsewhere in Europe8. Diocesan and parochial structures were firmly established
in the course of the twelfth century9. A further important development in the
last quarter of the century was the establishment of the independence of the
ecclesia Scoticana (Whithorn or Galloway always excepted) from the sway of
York or Canterbury. A series of Papal bulls, culminating probably around 1192
in Cum universi10, declared that not only was Scotland a special daughter of the
Papacy, but also that disputes about the possessions of the Scottish church should
be determined within the kingdom by Scots or papal appointees, unless an ap-
peal had been made to the papal courts in Rome11.
There is evidence that pre-Gratian canon law materials were known in Scot-
land12, and there cannot be much doubt that the Decretum was also in circula-
tion there. Before the end of the twelfth century there were diocesan functionar-
ies in Aberdeen, Glasgow and St Andrews known as ‘officials’, whose task was
to administer the canon law in consistory courts held under episcopal author-
ity13. Indeed, almost all the officials of whom we have knowledge before 1214
were university men, most probably in decreets14. Papal judges-delegate had
7. See generally Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (supra, n. 6), passim; R.H. Helmholz,
The Spirit of the Classical Canon Law, Athens Ga. 1996; H.J. Berman, Law and Revolu-
tion: the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Harvard 1983.
8. See generally G. Donaldson, Scottish Church History, Edinburgh 1985, p. 40–5;
S.D. Ollivant, The Court of the Official in Pre-Reformation Scotland, [Stair Society, 34],
Edinburgh 1982, especially at p. 22–7; P.C. Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives in
Scotland 1125–1286, [Stair Society, 45], Edinburgh 1998.
9. Donaldson, Scottish Church History (supra, n. 8), p. 11–24; I.B. Cowan, The Par-
ishes of Medieval Scotland, Edinburgh 1967.
10. See most recently A.D.M. Barrell, The background to Cum universi: Scoto-papal
relations, 1159–1192, Innes Review, 46 (1995).
11. For comment, see H.L. MacQueen, Regiam Majestatem, Scots law and national
identity, Scottish Historical Review, 74 (1995), p. 9.
12. See A.C. Lawrie (ed.), Early Scottish Charters prior to A.D. 1153, Glasgow 1905,
no. 263 (a grant of the old priory of Loch Leven by Bishop Robert of St Andrews to the
priory of St Andrews 1152/1153 ‘et cum his libris, id est ... exceptiones ecclesiasticarum
regularum’; D. Baird Smith, Canon law, in H. McKechnie (ed.), The Sources and Litera-
ture of Scots Law, [Stair Society, 1], Edinburgh 1936, at p. 187 observes that this book
‘may have been the Decretum or Panormia of Saint Ivo of Chartres’. For Ivo, see South-
ern, Scholastic Humanism (supra, n. 2), p. 252–62.
13. D.E.R. Watt, Fasti Ecclesie Scoticanae Medii Aevi, St Andrews 1969, p. 23, 187,
323.
14. For Matthew and Walter, officials of Aberdeen, see Watt, Fasti (supra, n. 13), p.
23, and Watt, A Biographical Dictionary of Scottish Graduates to A.D. 1410, Oxford 1977,
p. 1, 563; for William, official of Brechin, see Watt, Fasti, p. 56, and Watt, Dictionary, p.
582; for Matthew, official of Dunkeld (possibly the same man as Matthew, official of
Aberdeen, above), see Watt, Fasti, p. 124, and Watt, Dictionary, p. 1, 489; for John de
Huntingdon, official of Glasgow, see Watt, Fasti, p. 187, and Watt, Dictionary, p. 273 (but
note that John’s predecessor, Richard de Hassendean, does not appear in the latter work;
and for Ranulf de Wat and Laurence de Thornton, officials of St Andrews, see Watt, Fasti,
p. 323, and Watt, Dictionary, p. 531, 576–7.
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also begun to become familiar figures by 1200, and their use in Scotland was to
become commonplace from the pontificate of Innocent III (1198–1216)15. All
this meant that men with knowledge and experience of the learned laws were at
work as judges, pleaders and ecclesiastical administrators in Scotland by this
time: an outstanding example is William Malveisin, described by a contempo-
rary as utriusque juris peritus, that is, learned in both the canon and the civil
laws, bishop first of Glasgow in 1199 and then of St Andrews from 1202 until
his death in 123816. Malveisin’s career in Scotland was to last some fifty years,
with much of that time spent in the service, first of King William the Lion
(1165–1214), and then, as we shall see further below, of King Alexander II
(1214–1249). He is also on record as a judge-delegate on at least three occa-
sions17. Another clerk learned in the laws whose career was to straddle the two
reigns was Master Peter of Paxton (d. c. 1230), who served in the household of
King William’s brother, Earl David of Huntingdon, from the 1180s, and who on
12 November 1219 pledged his copies of the Digestum Novum, Codex, In-
fortiatum and Institutes – that is, most of the core texts of Roman law – to the
abbot and convent of Holyrood in security of a loan18. But Master Peter’s career
was spent more in England than in Scotland, his Paxton being in the earldom of
Huntingdon rather than the estate of the same in Berwickshire.
The Church could also bring effective pressure to bear on the secular law and
customs. The important concept of ‘default of justice’, which underpinned at
least some royal interventions in other courts, had roots in pre-Gratian canon
law19. There are also signs that the Church encouraged the king to set his sights
against at least some aspects of both the vengeance and the compensation as-
pects of society’s honour code, as involving either an inevitable spiral of vio-
lence or the condonation of mortal sin. Thus in 1197 the magnates and prelates
swore to assist King William to take vindicta of (i.e. punish) wrongdoers, and
not themselves to take pecunia from them so that justice was not done20. An-
other institution for the preservation of peace in which king and Church seem to
have joined forces was ecclesiastical sanctuary, within which one accused of
15. Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives (supra, n. 8), p. 120–2.
16. For his career, which was to extend into the reign of Alexander II until his death in
1238, see Watt, Dictionary (supra, n. 14), p. 374–9. See also D.D.R. Owen, William the
Lion: Kingship and Culture 1143–1214, East Linton 1997, in which it is suggested that
Malveisin was the Guillaume le Clerc who composed the Roman de Fergus. W.W. Scott
suggests that he may have been the author of Scottish annals based on the Melrose
Chronicle: D.E.R. Watt et al (edd.), The Scotichronicon of Walter Bower, 9 vols., Edin-
burgh 1987–96, 9, p. 251–9. See also A.A.M. Duncan, Roger of Howden and Scotland,
1187–1201, in B.E. Crawford (ed.), Church, Chronicle and Learning in medieval and early
Renaissance Scotland, Edinburgh 1999, p. 145–51.
17. Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives (supra, n. 8), p. 128.
18. C.W. Foster and K. Major (edd.), Registrum Antiquissimum of the Cathedral Church
of Lincoln, [Lincoln Record Society, 12 vols.], Lincoln 1931–73, 3, no. 821, facsimile also
on facing page; K.J. Stringer, Earl David of Huntingdon, Edinburgh 1985, p. 152.
19. Helmholz, Classical Canon Law (supra, n. 7), p. 119–20, 132–4.
20. T. Thomson and C. Innes (edd.), Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland 1124–1707,
12 vols., Edinburgh 1814–75, [henceforth APS], p. 377, c. 20. This assize appears to be
modelled upon the edictum regium of Hubert Walter in England in 1195, as to which see J.
Hudson, The Formation of the English Common Law, London and New York 1996, p. 138;
G.W.S. Barrow, The Kingdom of the Scots, London 1973, p. 111; A.A.M. Duncan, Scot-
land: The Making of the Kingdom, Edinburgh 1975, p. 201–3.
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wrongdoing could take at least temporary shelter from his victim and their kin.
Twelfth-century royal grants show that in at least some of these – for example,
the Stow of Wedale, Tyninghame and perhaps Innerleithen and Torphichen –
the peace of the Church was given additional support and a wider territorial
scope by that of the king, and it seems clear that this was intended to prevent
feuds from escalating in further violence and bloodshed21.
Influence could also be exercised through the activity of ecclesiastics in gov-
ernment: William Malveisin was the king’s chancellor as well as bishop of
Glasgow from 1199 to 1202, for example. Equally it might come directly from
the Papacy itself. As early as 1110/1113 Pope Paschal II was writing to Turgot
the bishop of St Andrews urging him to ensure that the laity in Scotland con-
formed to the canonical norms of marriage22. In 1200 Pope Innocent III in-
structed King William about the right of sanctuary afforded to those who, hav-
ing committed offences, fled to churches ‘that, through reverence for the sacred
place, they may escape the penalty they have incurred’23. Drawing on ‘the pre-
scriptions of the sacred canons and the teaching of the civil laws’, Innocent laid
down a series of propositions distinguishing between the position of free men
and serfs, and concluded:
Do you therefore, very dear son, see to it that when in the kingdom any such case
occurs you proceed according to the distinction hereinbefore drawn, that the honour
and immunity of churches may be preserved intact and the occasion of evil speaking
be taken away from men of a perverse disposition.
Around the same time John de Belmcis, the former archbishop of Lyons, wrote
to Malveisin as bishop of Glasgow to condemn the involvement of the clergy in
judicial duels or ordeals24. It thus seems clear that the Church sought to exercise
as much of a voice in the development of secular law and custom as it had in
relation to its own.
One of the issues which provoked Papal letters to the king of Scots was com-
petition between ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction. Early in the thirteenth
century Pope Innocent III sternly rebuked King William for allowing to be de-
cided in the king’s court a case about the right of patronage in the church of
Leuchars, disputed by St Andrews cathedral priory and Saer de Quinci, lord of
Leuchars25. But papal disapproval does not seem to have prevented the success-
ful assertion of secular jurisdiction in the case any more than it did shortly
21. See H.L. MacQueen, Girth: the law of sanctuary in Scotland, in J.W. Cairns and
O.F. Robinson (edd.), Critical Studies in Ancient Law, Comparative Law and Legal His-
tory: Essays in honour of Alan Watson, Oxford 2001, p. 333–52.
22. R. Somerville (ed.), Scotia Pontifica: Papal Letters to Scotland before the Pontifi-
cate of Innocent III, Oxford 1982, no. 2. See further Duncan, Scotland (supra, n. 20), p.
130; W.D.H. Sellar, Marriage, divorce and concubinage in Gaelic Scotland, Transactions
of the Gaelic Society of Inverness, 51 (1980), p. 474–5.
23. D. Patrick (ed.), Statutes of the Scottish Church 1225–1559, Edinburgh 1907, p.
205, from the Decretals, book 3 title 49 c. 6.
24. Ibid, p. 292. See further Duncan, Roger of Howden (supra, n. 16), p. 146–8.
25. T.M. Cooper, Select Scottish Cases of the Thirteenth Century, Edinburgh 1944, p.
7–8; Barrow, Kingdom (supra, n. 20), p. 90; Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives
(supra, n. 8), p. 181.
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afterwards in the celebrated litigation between Melrose abbey and the earl of
Dunbar over the lands of Sorrowlessfield near Earlston. Here the earl persis-
tently refused to answer before judges-delegate the monks’ complaint of his
violent occupation of the lands, pleading that as the case concerned a lay tene-
ment it ought to be heard before a secular court. The case was finally settled in
King William’s full court at Selkirk26. In both disputes the ecclesiastical argu-
ment was that when cases concerned land granted in alms, both the custom of
the realm and the custom of the Scottish church gave jurisdiction to the Church
courts; but the evidence of these two cases is that this claim could easily be
countered with one that the lands were lay and that there was no standard proce-
dure available comparable to the English assize Utrum of 1164, under which it
could be determined whether land was a lay fee or held in alms27.
In the reign of King William’s son, Alexander II, continuing developments
in the world of secular law and custom went alongside the continued growth of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Officials can be found in virtually every Scottish dio-
cese in the period, and on the whole they continued to be university men, pre-
sumably having studied decreets28. There was also a considerable growth in the
use of papal judges-delegate. Nearly half of the 158 cases identified by Dr Paul
Ferguson as having taken place before judges-delegate between 1165 and 1286
occurred in the reign of Alexander II29. Many if not all of these judges-delegate
must have been, like the ones who decided the great dispute over the lands of
Monachkenneran in 1233, ‘wise men learned in both the canon and the civil
laws’30. A striking example may be Master Laurence of Thornton, ‘the single
most frequent judge-delegate of the period [1209–1238/1240]’, and also offi-
cial of St Andrews diocese between 1203 and 1224 as well as a close associate
of Bishop Malveisin31.
The increasing role of judges-delegate during Alexander II’s reign must have
been apparent to contemporaries. This may be evident in the increasing number
of clashes between the ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions, especially where
a dispute over land broke out between a layman and the Church in some shape
26. Cooper, Cases (supra, n. 25), p. 9–11. See further on this case MacQueen, Com-
mon Law (supra, n. 1), p. 108, and Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives (supra, n.
8), p. 138–40.
27. On the assize Utrum, see Hudson, English Common Law (supra, n. 20), p. 129.
28. For Richard and ‘W.’, officials of Aberdeen, see Watt, Fasti (supra, n. 13), p. 23,
and Watt, Dictionary (supra, n. 14), p. 468–9 and 561–2; for Daniel and Maurice, officials
of Argyll, Watt, Fasti, p. 38; for Henry de Norham, official of Brechin, Watt, Fasti, p. 56,
and Watt, Dictionary, p. 430; for Durand and Geoffrey, officials of Galloway, Watt, Fasti,
p. 140; for Richard de Ancrum, official of Glasgow, Watt, Fasti, p. 187; for “M.” and “J.”,
officials of the Isles, Watt, Fasti, p. 212; for William Agnus, official of Moray, Watt,
Fasti, p. 244, and Watt, Dictionary, p. 3; for Walter de Mortimer and Andrew de Aber-
deen, officials of St Andrews, Watt, Fasti, p. 323, and Watt, Dictionary, p. 1, 419–20; and
for Alexander de St Martin, official of Lothian, Watt, Fasti, p. 327, and Watt, Dictionary,
p. 478. It is worthy of mention that the officials of Argyll, Galloway and the Isles are not
known to have been university men.
29. See Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives (supra, n. 8), Appendix I.
30. C. Innes (ed.), Registrum Monasterii de Passelet, [Maitland Club, 17], Glasgow
1832, p. 169.
31. Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives (supra, n. 8), p. 129; Watt, Fasti (su-
pra, n. 13), p. 323; idem, Dictionary (supra, n. 14), p. 531.
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or form. Like his father before him, King Alexander received papal letters re-
proaching him for allowing suits about land held in free alms to come before
secular tribunals32. An apparent innovation of his administration was a form of
royal prohibition by which litigation in an ecclesiastical forum could be halted
by the claim that the matter was secular. An early example is the case between
Robert Hood and the bishop of Moray over the lands of Llanbryde in 1225,
which began before judges-delegate but was prohibited by the king, ‘asserting
that the aforesaid manor was his barony and that therefore it should take place
in the royal and not an ecclesiastical court’33. The royal letters or brieves which
were used for this purpose probably took more or less the form found in the
later ‘registers’ of brieves, under which the Church court was prohibited from
proceeding in cases of lay tenements34. Their effectiveness is suggested by the
precaution which churchmen seem to have started to take, by obtaining from
their opponents in litigation a renunciation of the king’s letters of prohibition35.
But the picture of conflict between church and state should not be over-
dramatised. As Dr Ferguson has pointed out, churchmen were frequently able
to make claims to land against laymen successfully before judges-delegate,
while laymen often made claims against the Church in the same forum36. Dr
Ferguson concludes with appropriate caution37:
The picture which seems to emerge here is one of occasional instances in which
powerful laymen were able to defeat or delay their ecclesiastical opponents and to
force them into the secular forum. Secular jurisdiction was also invoked when the
subject of the suit was of particular interest to the Crown ... Where lesser men were
defenders, and where such interests were not involved, the jurisdiction of papal
judges-delegate seems seldom to have been challenged by secular jurisdiction. As
Duncan notes, however, a firm conclusion on this issue will require a comprehen-
sive study not only of the cases before judges-delegate but also of the many compo-
sitions which may have resulted from litigation in the secular forum.
The jurisdiction of the canon law in the affairs of the laity seems to have won
acceptance in questions of status, marriage and legitimacy38. At the very end of
King Alexander’s reign and at the beginning of that of his successor, Alwin of
Callendar and John of Kinross, both laymen, were litigating before papal judges-
delegate over John’s claim that Alwin was illegitimate and therefore not en-
32. W. Smythe (ed.), Liber Ecclesie de Scon, [Bannatyne Club, 78], Edinburgh 1843,
no. 120. See also C. Innes (ed.), Registrum Episcopatus Glasguensis, [Bannatyne Club,
75; Maitland Club, 63], Edinburgh and Glasgow 1843, vol. I, nos. 158, 161; Ferguson,
Medieval Papal Representatives (supra, n. 8), p. 187.
33. C. Innes (ed.), Registrum Episcopatus Moraviensis, [Bannatyne Club, 58], Edin-
burgh 1837, appendix, p. 459, no. 6.
34. Lord Cooper, The Register of Brieves, [Stair Society, 10], Edinburgh 1946, p. 46,
no. 64; p. 55, nos. 23–7; A.A.M. Duncan, Formulary E: Scottish Letters and Brieves 1286–
1424, University of Glasgow, Scottish History Department Occasional Paper 1976, nos.
4–7.
35. MacQueen, Common Law (supra, n. 1), p. 110.
36. See Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives (supra, n. 8), p. 140–1, 181–2, 187–
9.
37. Ibid., p. 189.
38. Ibid., p. 157–9.
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titled to inherit certain lands which would otherwise fall to John39. The case
nicely illustrates the interaction between the ecclesiastical and the secular in
matters of law and litigation. Since the lands in question were unquestionably a
lay tenement, a judgement in John’s favour on the legitimacy point would not
have concluded the process of recovering the lands. He would have had to go
off to the secular courts for that purpose. But at the same time the substance of
the canonical rules on marriage and legitimacy was crucial to the secular rules
on inheritance of land, since one dubbed illegitimate by the canon law would be
excluded from any claim to inherit.
Major developments occurred in the general canon law itself during the reign
of Alexander II. Apart from the promulgation of the Liber Extra in 1234, al-
ready mentioned, in November 1215 there took place in Rome under Pope In-
nocent III the Fourth Lateran Council, which ushered in a large number of ma-
jor reforms, including, most significantly for our purposes, a prohibition upon
clerical participation in the ordeal40. Although the Council was attended by three
Scottish bishops, including William Malveisin, and by Henry abbot of Kelso41,
there were problems in administering its reforms in Scotland through the lack
of a metropolitan archbishop. This led to the establishment by Pope Honorius
III of the Provincial Council of the Scottish Church in 122542. This became, not
only the deliberative body of the Scottish Church, but also both a legislative and
a judicial body. Donald Watt observes in his account of the Provincial Coun-
cil43:
Provincial councils everywhere after the Fourth Lateran Council were charged with
reform of ‘mores’, meaning presumably prevailing customs of all kinds. In Scot-
land, as elsewhere, a consequence was that the decades after 1215 saw local church
leaders compiling collections of statutes for approval at both diocesan and provin-
cial levels. ... [T]he bulk of the Scottish provincial statutes is concerned with defin-
ing matters of local custom, rather than with emphasising the universal law of the
Church. ... Whatever a pope like Innocent III might think, the Corpus [Juris Ca-
nonici] was no monolithic code of law ready to be enforced everywhere throughout
the Church: it was a quarry from which church lawyers were constantly excavating
rules which they claimed to be the law of the Church, but which were interpreted in
widely divergent ways by different schools of lawyers.
The Provincial Council was not the only body to issue legislation between
1214 and 1249. Perhaps the single most significant piece of legal material sur-
viving from the reign of Alexander II is his statutes, which undoubtedly em-
39. Cooper, Cases (supra, n. 25), p. 61–5; Ferguson, Medieval Papal Representatives
(supra, n. 8), p. 158–9.
40. For a translation of the decrees of the Council, see H. Rothwell (ed.), English His-
torical Documents, III: 1189–1327, London 1975, p. 643–76. The abolition of clerical
participation in the ordeal is c. 18 (ibid, p. 654). On the Council see J. Sayers, Innocent III:
Leader of Europe 1198–1216, London and New York 1994, p. 95–101, 114–15.
41. A.O. Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History 500–1286, Edinburgh 1922; re-
printed Stanford 1990, II. p. 405.
42. Statutes of the Scottish Church (supra, n. 23), p. 1.
43. D.E.R. Watt, The Provincial Council of the Scottish Church 1215–1472, in A. Grant
and K.J. Stringer (edd.), Medieval Scotland: Crown, Lordship and Community, Edinburgh
1993, p. 147, 151.
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body and reflect extremely important steps in the creation of the Scottish com-
mon law. They appear in particular to give a new prominence to the jury as an
instrument of justice in both civil and criminal matters, to reduce dependence
on the duel and the ordeal, and, finally, to be the occasion of the introduction of
the pleadable brieve of dissasine or novel dissasine, modelled on the crucially
important English common law writ of novel disseisin.
The deployment of the jury, and the downplaying of the duel and the ordeal,
in these statutes has taken on significance mainly as the Scottish response to the
abolition of clerical participation in the ordeal by the Church at the Fourth
Lateran Council in 1215. Robert Bartlett has shown how this withdrawal of
ecclesiastical support undermined the credibility of the ordeal as the judgement
of God, and therefore presented a major crisis for the secular systems of justice
throughout Europe44. It seems clear that the need for alternative systems of proof
which was universally felt in the difficult cases in which the ordeal had previ-
ously been available must also have been applicable in  Scotland. Ian Willock
has rightly cautioned against seeing the statute of 1230 as representing the de-
finitive abolition of the ordeal in Scotland and its replacement with the jury
(here described as a visnet) as a mode of proof, since in terms it is confined to
cases of theft and robbery45. Similarly, the statute which requires the use of a
local group of persons (i.e. a jury) to consider the complaints of those ‘who
ought not to fight’ must be seen as a specific solution in a particular context –
the loss and recovery of moveable property – rather than an attempt to abolish
the duel in all cases46. But nonetheless the statute does reflect the influence
brought to bear on the secular law by ecclesiastical pressure, personified at
Stirling by Bishop Malveisin in particular. He had attended the Lateran Council
and had already been a no doubt willing recipient and disseminator of corre-
spondence from other ecclesiastics railing against the judicial duel47. It was
probably Malveisin again who, having remained in Rome after the Lateran
Council48, had procured from Pope Innocent III in 1216 a bull specifically con-
demning the ‘baneful custom’ in Scotland by which the clergy could be com-
pelled to undergo judicial duels49. Prominent amongst the persons who under
the 1230 statute were not to fight duels were men of religion, clerks and preben-
daries50; and this probably had some effect, to judge from two brieves of protec-
tion issued by the king in 1232, taking the monks of Melrose and Balmerino
respectively under royal protection and instructing all his sheriffs to treat the
causes of the monks as though they were the king’s own, including finding a
champion (pugnatorem) for them if need be51.
44. See R. Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water: the medieval judicial ordeal, Oxford 1986.
45. APS, I, p. 400, c. 6; I.D. Willock, The Origins and Development of the Jury in
Scotland, [Stair Society, 23], Edinburgh 1966, p. 23–8.
46. APS, I, p. 399, c. 5.
47. See above, p. 283.
48. See Anderson, Early Sources (supra, n. 41), II, p. 405, 431.
49. Statutes of the Scottish Church (supra, n. 23), p. 293.
50. APS, I, p. 399, c. 5.
51. C. Innes (ed.), Liber Sancte Marie de Melros, [Bannatyne Club, 56], Edinburgh
1837, no. 175; Eighth Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, [Scottish History Soci-
ety, 3rd series, 43], Edinburgh 1951, p. 8–9.
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Further legislation in 124552 provided that the justiciar of Lothian should
hold an inquest to identify wrongdoers within his jurisdiction since Christmas
1243. Those identified were to be arrested and brought before the justiciar and
a faithful visnet, which would determine whether they were guilty of ‘murthra’
(probably meaning secret killing, unseen by witnesses), robbery or similar felo-
nies pertaining to the king’s crown. If so, all their goods would be forfeit to the
king. But conviction of such lesser crimes as theft or homicide (i.e. killing other
than murthra53) would lead to forfeiture to their lord. The procedure of indict-
ment by inquest and trial before the justiciar was to continue in future, but all
those convicted of theft or homicide would be handed over to their lords to have
justice carried out without any redemption save by the grace of the king.
As Geoffrey Barrow has observed, the procedure introduced in 1245 is highly
reminiscent of the jury of presentment introduced in England by the Assize of
Clarendon in 116654. But the influence of canonical criminal procedure must
also be taken into account. From early in the thirteenth century, and in particu-
lar after the Lateran Council in 1215, the Church was developing the accusatory
process of the inquisition, ‘so-called’, writes James Brundage55,
because it was conceived of as an investigatory process initiated by public authori-
ties, such as judges, who operated through inquiry (per inquisitionem) into wrong-
doing that was a matter of common knowledge or grave suspicion (notorium, mani-
festa and fama were the terms generally used to describe such affairs).
The process was concerned with the ‘occult crimes’, such as heresy, which did
not lend themselves to ready or decisive proof; and it is striking that the inquest
established by the Scottish statute of 1245 was to concern itself with secret
killings and robberies, violent crimes to which the only witness apart from the
perpetrators might well be the victim. A combination with direct English influ-
ence seems quite probable, however, since in a final provision of the 1245 stat-
ute, any knight indicted by the inquest was to have a visnet of other knights or
freeholders of heritage. This principle of ‘trial by peers’, found in Magna Carta
(cc 21, 39, 59), was to be repeated in the last known legislation of the reign, at
Stirling in May 124856.
What were the factors which led the 1230 gathering at Stirling to take the
step of introducing an action for dissasine? The statute’s reference to dissasine
by the complainer’s ‘lord or any other person’ suggests the possible relevance
of a debate amongst English legal historians as to the origins of novel disseisin.
Was the assize originally simply a means of regulating the lord’s power to dis-
52. APS, I, p. 403–4, c. 14.
53. The statute is an interesting indication that the distinctions of homicide which would
later crystallise as killing by forethought felony or upon a suddently were already present
in the criminal law. See further W.D.H. Sellar, Forethocht felony, malice aforethought and
the classification of homicide, in W.M. Gordon and T.D. Fergus (edd.), Legal History in
the Making, London and Ronceverte 1991, p. 43–59.
54. Barrow, Kingdom (supra, n. 20), p. 112.
55. Medieval Canon Law (supra, n. 6), p. 94–5.
56. APS, I, p. 404, c. 15. See further J.C. Holt, Magna Carta, 2nd edn, Cambridge
1992. For possible influence from the learned laws see R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and
the ius commune, University of Chicago Law Review, 66 (1999), especially at p. 326–9.
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cipline tenants who failed to perform the services owed for their land by eject-
ing them from their tenement? This would explain, amongst other things, the
requirement that the disseisin be ‘unjust and without a judgment’; a just judg-
ment of the lord’s court was necessary before a tenant could be expelled from
his holding57.
But while this view has offered a powerful insight into a world in which
disseisin could happen otherwise than through casual, almost anarchic violence,
and links in an important way with the principle that the king would remedy
defects of justice in the courts of others, it has not gained acceptance as the sole
explanation for the development of the action. In support of this conclusion, it
may be noted, the Scottish statute does not see lords as the only dissaisors against
whom redress might be sought. Another potential source of disseisin which
emerges from the English evidence was the Church, enforcing its rights to land,
not as a feudal lord, but under the canon law rules which required bishops to
recover land unjustly alienated by their predecessors. Could novel disseisin have
been the means by which laymen who had acquired land from the Church were
enabled to resist the processes of the canon law58? Did the problem extend fur-
ther, as our earlier discussion of the clashes between ecclesiastical and secular
jurisdiction in cases about land may suggest, to the expulsion of laymen from
their holdings following litigation before judges-delegate?
I have suggested in my book that a dispute which was ongoing around 1230
before Walter Olifard as justiciar of Lothian may have been a specific trigger
for legislative action in Scotland59. The case was between Patrick, son of the
earl of Dunbar, and the priory of Coldingham. Patrick was said to be unjustly
occupying the priory’s lands of Swinewood in Berwickshire. The whole matter
was eventually settled in Walter’s justiciary court at Roxburgh in 1231, when
Patrick renounced his claim and acknowledged the plenum ius of the priory to
the lands. Was this settlement obtained because the priory now had to hand a
royal remedy by which its claim could be made good? It may be significant that
Thomas Melsanby, prior of Coldingham, was another who was present at Stirling
in October 1230 to assent to the passage of the statute on dissasine. But if there
was a connection between this case and the statute, then it is worth noting that
there does not appear to have been any tenurial relationship between Patrick
and the priory, and that in this case it was the ecclesiastical organisation which
successfully resisted the claims of the layman, even in the secular court.
In sum, therefore, while during the reign of Alexander II royal justice clearly
built on foundations already laid in the course of the twelfth century, it also
became more articulate and systematic, and began to assert much more strongly
not just ultimate, but also exclusive jurisdiction within the realm in relation to
secular land. The claims of the ecclesiastical courts were resisted and circum-
57. The argument begins with S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feu-
dalism, Cambridge 1975, p. 1–35; see now Hudson, English Common Law (supra, n. 20),
p. 193–8.
58. M. Cheney, The litigation between John Marshal and Archbishop Thomas Becket
in 1164: a pointer in the origins of novel disseisin? in J.A. Guy and H.G. Beale (edd.), Law
and Social Change in British History, London 1984, p. 9–26.
59. J. Raine, The History and Antiquities of North Durham, London 1852, appendix,
no. 126; MacQueen, Common Law (supra, n. 1), p. 142–3.
290 HECTOR L. MAcQUEEN [12]
scribed. A key instrument in this process was the royal brieve, by the increas-
ingly standardised forms of which the claims of royal justice were made appar-
ent in both secular and ecclesiastical fora.
But it would be wrong to see the legal developments of this period purely as
a reaction to the presence of competition from the Church. In particular, the
Church can be seen to have provided an impetus for change quite apart from the
breadth of its jurisdictional claims. As the guardian of the spiritual and moral
health of Christendom, it brought a wholly different kind of pressure to bear
upon secular law and custom, a pressure which seems to have borne fruit in
Scotland. The most obvious example discussed or mentioned in this paper is the
success of the ecclesiastical attack upon the judicium Dei, and the deployment
in its place of the inquest or jury. But many other instances can be given. The
fundamental concept of default of justice as a means of expanding royal juris-
diction was transplanted from the canon law. Criminal law, and in particular the
gradations of homicide, seems to be informed by the moral perceptions of the
Church, as does the desire, already evident in the twelfth century, to repress the
settlement of feud by private settlement rather than by just punishment. The
canon law of marriage, legitimacy and status not only challenged the lax cus-
toms of the laity but came to lie at the heart of the secular rules about the inher-
itance of land. We may also suspect that it was the Church which was the most
important influence in establishing the right of women to inherit despite much
contrary social practice. In this way the development of Scots law was exposed
to the influence of wider patterns of development in Europe. At the same time it
drew inspiration from the rising common law of England, while retaining much
from a past that stretched back beyond the twelfth century. In 1254, five years
after the death of King Alexander, Pope Innocent IV issued the bull Dolentes,
identifying Scotland as a land where the affairs of the laity were governed by
lay customs and those of the church by the canons of the holy fathers60. Under-
standably the Pope did not dwell on the interplay just observed between the lay
customs and the canon law, but it was already, and would continue to be, a vital
ingredient in the emergence of a distinctive common law of Scotland.
60. The text of the bull is to be found in H.R. Luard (ed.), Matthaei Parisiensis Chronica
Majora, London 1872–83, vol. VI, p. 295.
